



Moving Forward...



SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE

“Seek peace . . . and pursue it”

Psalm 34:15

SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE is a new campaign of the Reform Movement of Judaism. Our mission is to educate, encourage, and mobilize North American Jewry to support the peace process and social justice issues in Israel.

This initiative was made possible in part by a generous three-year grant from the Ford Foundation to the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Reform Judaism’s synagogue arm.

To achieve our goals, **SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE** will comprise all components of the Reform Movement, from our youth programs, camps, and schools; brotherhoods, WRJ sisterhoods, and Zionist groups; rabbis, cantors, and educators, as well as the involvement of our more than 900 congregations.

SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE will encourage the North American Jewish community to examine the risks and rewards of peace for Israel and the Palestinians, and to undertake critical, constructive public dialogue on the most pressing issues facing Israeli society – including the status of Arab citizens of Israel and other minorities, as well as other issues of inequality and discrimination in Israel today. In this effort, the Reform Movement will work closely with other agencies and organizations devoted to enhancing the prospects for peace and justice.



President Clinton looks on as Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (z"l) and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shake hands on the White House Lawn after the signing of the Declaration of Principles. September 13, 1993.

We will provide publications, educational materials and program ideas for synagogues, educators, rabbis, youth groups, and communities to use at the local level in order to engage and educate the North American Jewish community on the critical issues facing Israel today. These programs will include curricula, speakers series, Israel trips, interfaith dialogues, as well as the launch of a web site and an on-line email forum.

If you are interested in speaking with someone about **SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE** please contact Esther Lederman, Project Director at [212-650-4160/2](tel:212-650-4160) or send an email to seekingpeace@uahc.org.

The Union of American Hebrew Congregations is the central body of Reform Judaism in North America, encompassing 1.5 million Reform Jews in more than 900 synagogues. UAHC services include camps, music and book publishing, outreach to unaffiliated and intermarried Jews, educational programming, and the Religious Action Center in Washington, DC.

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The Reform Movement of Judaism is determined to do what it can to help advance the cause of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. To that end, we are launching a major educational campaign among the North American Jewish community so that we may have a more mature and complete understanding of both the problems and the opportunities Israel faces in its quest for peace. We believe it is important that the North American Jewish community is exposed to the range of opinion that characterizes the debate over peace within Israel.

One of the ways we hope to engage the community is by publishing articles and essays that will help expand our knowledge of the issues that need to be addressed for peace to be achieved.

This first publication of SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE, is entitled “Moving Forward...” Yossi Beilin, one of Israel’s leading intellectuals and an architect of the Oslo Accords, published an essay on the future of peace negotiations for Israel after the outburst of violence in late September. It was published on November 18th, 2000 in the Israeli newspaper *Ha’aretz*.

With the permission of the author, his essay is republished here. We then asked a number of leading Israelis and American Jews to respond to some of the issues Beilin raises in his essay. We gave the contributors a list of questions to be used as a guide in writing their responses. They have been included below.

We hope you find this publication helpful in formulating your own thoughts about the future of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Please note that the responses are the sole opinion of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reform Movement of Judaism.

QUESTIONS:

In general, what are your reactions to the Beilin essay? Do you share Beilin’s appraisal of Oslo’s historic role — and of its present status? Do you share his specific outline of a final status agreement?

There are those who contend that recent events show that Arafat cannot be trusted as a partner for peace. Do you share that appraisal? If so, how can the cause of peace be advanced?

Similarly, do recent events show that the Palestinian people still desire Israel’s destruction? If that is so, is not any peace agreement a delusion?

David Grossman has recently suggested that Israel unilaterally close most West Bank and Gaza settlements. Do you agree? Why/why not?

Is unilateral separation possible? Is it desirable?

What actions can Israel take in the immediate future that might advance the cause of peace?

Beyond expressions of concern and solidarity, is there a constructive role for North American Jewry?

The UAHC, in cooperation with the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (RAC), ARZA/WORLD UNION North America, and the Israel Religious Action Center oversee **SEEKING PEACE, PURSUING JUSTICE**. Other UAHC affiliate organizations - including Women of Reform Judaism (WRJ), North American Federation of Temple Brotherhoods (NFTB), North American Federation of Temple Youth (NFTY), National Association of Temple Educators (NATE), and American Conference of Cantors (ACC) - also play a role.

Moving Forward After Oslo

The Oslo Accords are neither alive nor dead. They have served their purpose, and now it's time to move on

By Yossi Beilin

A. The argument as to whether "Oslo" is alive or dead is truly pathetic. The right is making every effort to shout out the news of the death of Oslo, and on the left some are fighting them tenaciously, claiming that Oslo is alive and well. But Oslo is neither a religious belief nor an ideology. It is a means of realizing the clause of "The framework for peace in the Middle East which was agreed upon at Camp David" in 1978, a clause which was in fact adopted in the principles which led to the Madrid Conference in 1991. I initiated the process in 1992, using a secret channel, in order to overcome the difficult obstacles of the Madrid talks, which were being held at a snail's pace in Washington. The fact that it was this channel which brought about an agreement turned it into the main road to peace. On the one hand, Oslo implemented Camp David, 1978: autonomy for five years, a strong local police force and the beginning of talks about a permanent agreement, a few years after the signing of the interim agreement. On the other hand, some new points were decided on at Oslo: The most important of these was making the PLO a partner to the talks (as opposed to a general reference to "Palestinians" at Camp David 1978). The second was the transfer of Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinian Authority even before the elections to choose its leadership, and the third was the transfer of territories to the PA in stages, within a year and a half. (At Camp David 1978, the plan was for immediate transfer of the territories to Palestinian autonomy after the elections for PA leadership!)

Only those who have forgotten the 1978 Camp David agreements are trying to blame Oslo for the stages, the postponement of a final agreement, or the romantic dream that its framework would create such great affection between Israel and the Palestinians that there would be no problem in reaching a final agreement. The late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin considered it very important that his agreement be as similar as possible to that reached by the late prime minister Menachem Begin, because he (mistakenly) believed that if it was, a very wide consensus would be created in the Knesset for the signing of the agreement.

What really happened in the intervening years? The PLO did in fact change -- from a terrorist organization into the establishment facing an Islamic, terrorist-oriented opposition, which the PLO restrains in varying degrees. Until recently -- with the exception of some extremely serious terrorist incidents, which began 40 days after the massacre perpetrated by Dr. Baruch Goldstein in the Cave of the Patriarchs in 1994, and which reached a climax after terrorist Yihye Ayash was killed in 1996 -- there was a lull in Palestinian terrorism, with formal security cooperation between the two sides. Moreover, Israel was delivered from its international pariah status, maintained political and economic ties with 13 out of 21 members of the Arab League, made peace with Jordan and benefited from economic investments, thanks to political stability and security.

But already during the Rabin-Peres era, and especially during the three years when Benjamin Netanyahu served as prime minister, there were delays in the transfer of the territories to the Palestinians. When the five years of the interim period ended on May 4, 1999, most of the territories were still in Israeli hands, the negotiations for a final agreement, which were supposed to begin in May 1996, had not begun, important clauses in the agreement (such as the safe passage from Gaza to the West Bank, and the stages) had not been carried out by Israel, while other important clauses had not been implemented by the Palestinians (such as cessation of incitement and collection of unauthorized weapons).

With the return to government of the Labor Party, headed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement was signed, as a continuation of the Wye agreement signed by Benjamin Netanyahu, and from here on, emphasis was placed on a new central issue: the negotiations for a final agreement. From this point one can say that the Oslo agreement has served its purpose: It determined who would be the Palestinian partner to the talks; it gave rise to the PA and to cooperation with it; and it engendered the economic and other agreements. Now, it has outlived its usefulness, just as other interim agreements outlived their usefulness and were exchanged for permanent or other contracts.

The Oslo process is an historical fact which can be considered a breakthrough toward an overall peace, just as it can be considered a bad mistake on the way to conceding most of the territories which we conquered in 1967 in Gaza and the West Bank. It will have failed only if the PA disap-

pears, and Israel goes back to ruling in Gaza and Nablus. If that doesn't happen, Oslo will remain a preparatory stage for a permanent agreement between ourselves and the Palestinians, a process whose principles created a breakthrough, and are alive and well, even if Oslo itself is over.

The attempt to “stretch” the five years of the interim agreement to a longer period will fail. Therefore, and mainly in the wake of Camp David 2000 and the difficult events of recent weeks, there is no logic to continuing with temporary steps, and a permanent solution is essential, mainly the creation of a final border between Israel and the Palestinian state which will be determined by agreement.

If it isn't possible to reach either a full permanent agreement or a partial one, and we have to reach an interim agreement, it definitely will not be the “Oslo agreement,” because Oslo did not have to answer the question of how Israelis and Palestinians will live here in the absence of a permanent agreement, after five years of an interim agreement.

B. The next chapter in our relations with the Palestinians can be opened only when the level of violence abates, security cooperation between the two sides is resumed, and there is a serious renewal of the Palestinian attempt to prevent terror by extremist Islamic groups. In such a situation, it will be possible to attempt to exploit the last window of opportunity which remains to us in the near future: the period between the U.S. elections and the swearing in of the new President on January 20, 2001 [Editor's note: this was written before the end of the Clinton Administration's term]. We can still take advantage of the good offices of President Clinton, and reach a permanent agreement which will not cross the red lines of either side, and which will be based on the following principles:

1. An unarmed Palestinian state will be founded, with its capital in Al Quds.
2. The 1967 border will be adjusted to include the big settlement blocs in which about 80 percent of the settlers live, and will expand the Gaza Strip. This will be a complete implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242.
3. Security arrangements will be made to allow for Israeli presence on the Jordan River, and for early warning stations.
4. The problem of the Palestinian refugees from 1948 will be solved completely, through economic rehabilitation of the refugees and by offering

them the option of being absorbed either in the Palestinian state to be founded, in the countries where they now live, or in additional countries which will agree to absorb them. Israel will participate in solving their economic problems, while continuing the process of reunification of families, and taking humanitarian problems into consideration.

5. Jerusalem, including all of its parts, will remain an open and united city. All the Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem will be recognized as part of Jerusalem, the capital of Israel. Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem will be recognized as Al Quds, the capital of the Palestinian state. The holy places will be administered by a cooperative body which will be set up by the two states, while the question of sovereignty over the Temple Mount will be solved in such a way that the rules of behavior there will be set out in an agreement in the spirit of the situation there today; the formal definition of the situation will be determined by compromise (religious sovereignty, extra-territorial sovereignty, et al), or will be postponed to a later date.

If it is not possible to reach a comprehensive agreement, an effort will be made to sign a partial-permanent agreement, which will solve some of the issues completely, while solving the others (perhaps the issue of the refugees and Jerusalem) only partially, but which will leave both sides interested in reaching a comprehensive agreement at a later stage.

Clearly, once again we face the question as to whether those who sign the agreement with us can be trusted. This doubt has always existed, and it naturally becomes more acute in the wake of the events of recent weeks. My answer is that we have to rely first of all on ourselves, and to ensure that any agreement will include security arrangements which will enable us to deal with serious infractions of that agreement, if there are any.

Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that during the past few years we have felt more secure than during most periods of our history; this security was a result of the Oslo agreement, which included freedom of movement for Israelis in Palestinian cities, for reasons varying from commerce, to prayer, to gambling.

It is of course possible to marshal many arguments to strengthen doubts about the other side, but whoever does this, and for that reason rejects any future agreement, must offer an alternative, and any alternative in the guise

of Hamas or similar organizations is worse. Those who have been further convinced by the recent events that there is no chance for peace, and those who have finally “sobered up” as a result of what the Palestinians call the al-Aqsa Intifada, have despaired of the Zionist vision, in my opinion.

Zionism was founded in order to save Jews from persecution and anti-Semitism, and not in order to offer them a Jewish Sparta or -- God forbid -- a new Masada (the desert fortress where Jews committed suicide rather than surrender to the Romans, after the destruction of the Second Temple). The long conflict with our Arab neighbors was not part of the plan of the founders of Zionism, but when we became embroiled in it, we did everything possible in order to overcome those who tried to kill us, only out of a belief that in the long run, and not at the “end of days,” we would be able to live a normal, peaceful life in this country.

If today we get up and say that it has been proven that there is no chance for a normal life here, and that the intermittent periods of violence are inevitable, we will bring about two phenomena: Those who are young and flexible enough will leave the country, and Jews who live in developed countries will not consider joining us. The nationalist right and those who are turning right in autumn 2000, are likely to bring a fatal winter to the Zionist dream. ♦

Dr. Yossi Beilin is the Israeli Minister of Justice. He has held a number of key positions within the Israeli government over the past 20 years; he was first elected to the Knesset in 1988 and later served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1992-95. He was one of the original architects of the Oslo Accords and has authored a number of leading books on Israel's history, the peace process and Jewish affairs. This article was originally published in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz and is reprinted here with the author's permission.

The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Badly Wounded, Not Destroyed

by Steven L. Spiegel

Since the al-Aksha Intifada began on September 29, many people are asking what happened between Israel and the Palestinians? In July, at Camp David, they seemed to be close to a comprehensive settlement. By October, they were in a near war. What went wrong? Was the peace process itself a deception?

In beginning to answer these questions, I think it is a mistake to think about Oslo as a chapter which has ended as Yossi Beilin seems to do in his essay. He quite accurately looks at a whole series of events from the original Camp David summit in 1978 to Madrid in 1991 to Oslo and beyond in the peace process. In this, I fully agree. But I think it is more helpful not to engage in what he properly calls the “pathetic” debate over whether Oslo is alive or dead. Instead, it is better to view the picture as a gradual but historical search for accommodation in the area which will not end with specific setbacks or breakthroughs, but rather which will take many years.

The importance of viewing peace efforts as an inexorable process is to place current disappointments in an understandable context. Peace efforts are a very slow, difficult, frustrating endeavor. There have been, are, and will be setbacks along the way. Is Yasser Arafat an ideal partner? Absolutely not. Nor is his policy or society. But adversaries do not have the option of picking their partners. As Yitzhak Rabin used to say, you make peace with adversaries, not friends. The trick in diplomacy is to work with leaders on the other side who do not agree with you, and who may take actions you deplore. And yet, if you can produce agreements with these difficult negotiators across the table, then the deals are even more important because the challenge is so great. Israel may not in the end succeed in making viable deals with Arafat, but as long as the option exists it benefits by trying. The Israelis and the Palestinians are doomed by fate to coexist side by side in a very small place and neither is strong enough to defeat totally and finally the other, so both have to keep returning to the negotiating table. Despite their different tactics and preferences, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, Barak, and even Sharon all recognized this fundamental underlying fact about Israel's security equation.

The Israelis and Palestinians came together as a consequence of the Oslo negotiations in 1993 because both sides needed each other. However, once the process began, the parties discovered that it could include not only confidence-building measures but confidence-destroying actions as well. Skeptics on both sides did not accept the fundamental idea of a settlement. There were Israelis who did not trust the Palestinians and who rejected a process in which Israel would gradually withdraw from all or much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were also Palestinians, particularly represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who were not prepared to give up the objective of destroying Israel.

The process of a series of interim agreements built into Oslo turned out to be deeply controversial. Many Israelis worried that they were giving up too much too soon. At various points, negotiations dragged on for months with many diplomatic crises along the way, leading to a variety of agreements, which were often reached only after intense acrimony that robbed them of the confidence-building service they should have performed. The very process of attempting to settle these disputes served frequently to erode confidence on both sides. Palestinians saw a continued occupation, a substantial number of expanding Israeli settlements, an increase in the number of settlers, missed diplomatic deadlines, a declining economy (caused only in part by the series of closures imposed by successive Israeli governments in response to Palestinian terrorist attacks), a corrupt Palestinian regime which did not bring them prosperity or democracy, a tough and ungenerous Israeli negotiating stance in trade negotiations, and miserable lives seemingly unaided by the peace process. By 2000, most Palestinians according to polls saw themselves as worse off than they had been in 1993.

Israelis, for their part, saw the Palestinian Authority presiding over continuing violence, hostile rhetoric, a Palestinian educational system and a media devoted to incitement against them in an anti-Semitic atmosphere, a Palestinian clergy deeply hostile to Israel, the lack of progress with other Arab states, including Egypt, and a Palestinian negotiating stance which seemed to indicate an unwillingness or inability to compromise. Indeed, many Israelis still thought by 2000 that the Palestinians would not accept a final settlement but rather that their true objective was the destruction of the State of Israel.

There were, of course, major achievements by the Oslo process. By mid-2000 Israel had withdrawn from the territories in which most Palestinians

resided and therefore only ruled a small minority of Palestinians. For their part, the Palestinians had engaged with the United States and Israel in a process of security cooperation which had made the year and a half before the al-Aksa Intifada a period in which terrorism had almost terminated. Fewer Israelis were killed at the hands of Palestinians than at any time in over 33 years. Indeed, 1999 became a record year because two Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists -- the lowest in Israel's history.

The surface represented a record of achievement, promise and potential, but the underlying misgivings on both sides were profound and even growing. One of the worst deficiencies of the Oslo process was that it was largely private. Negotiators, administrators and security officials might experience productive -- even amicable -- relations, but these were not translated into public events. Thus the silent majorities in both societies remained confused - even skeptical. They did not see the camaraderie established between diplomats, soldiers and even businessmen, but rather the violence, hostile rhetoric and disappointment were more prominent to the public. The symbol of the Palestinians to many Israelis became the terrorists, or the transmission of harsh anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish rhetoric by the media, educators, politicians, and the clergy. The symbol of Israel to most Palestinians became the humiliations of daily life under occupation from checkpoints to settlers.

Thus Camp David occurred in the wake of this contradictory and even schizophrenic process. At the meeting, committees met and issues were discussed, including security, borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and economic/structural factors such as water and economy. Much progress was made, but on the two critical issues (refugees and Jerusalem), the parties stalled. On the one hand, this was the first time they had ever seriously addressed these issues, and that itself represented progress. On the other hand, a summit is almost never a proper occasion for discussing issues for the first time. Whatever the progress reached, it was not enough and in retrospect the preparatory meetings were inadequate and the background work, especially by the Israelis and Palestinians, too primitive.

Where do we go from here?

First, we must review the lessons of Oslo very carefully. It is not the agreements themselves that were flawed, but their implementation. Missed deadlines, expansion of settlements, continued violence, the incitement inherent

in Palestinian media and education against Israel all produced an atmosphere in which this explosion could occur. Compliance with the Oslo agreements and with present and future agreements will have to be monitored more carefully. When Palestinians smuggle into their territory more guns than is acceptable under agreements or increase the number of policemen beyond those who have been permitted, these violations cannot be allowed to stand indefinitely. Nor can the expansion of Israeli settlements or the number of settlers. Agreements cannot work if fundamental portions of signed documents are ignored. Even violations of the spirit rather than the letter of agreements clearly can have a lethal effect.

Second, violence must end as part of a package. It is inadequate only to conclude a simple cease-fire which likely will not be adhered to in any case, as we have seen in violated agreements since the crisis began on September 28. Rather, in the short-term we should have a more ambitious goal. We need a reciprocal set of measures that involve complying with past agreements which will be more effective in leading to a new cycle of confidence building. Unilateral actions, especially by the stronger party, Israel, may result in reversing the escalation of the al-Aksa intifada if they are quickly matched by comparable confidence-building steps by the Palestinians.

Third, the violence must end by an act which provides hope for both sides. Thus, although the search for the comprehensive type of accord embodied by Camp David must continue, the final status package is difficult indeed to achieve, especially because of Barak's justifiable insistence on an end of conflict clause. It will unfortunately likely be necessary to go back to interim arrangements on the way to comprehensiveness if the process is to be revised. Both peoples must have a sign that the process is back on track, and therefore even routine confidence-building measures are more important than ever.

The pursuit of the following four principles is therefore essential to de-escalation: 1) commitment to compliance with all agreements which have been reached in the past; 2) some kind of moratorium on violence either unilaterally initiated or a consequence of parallel actions; 3) confidence-building measures and even interim steps during the months while a comprehensive agreement is being negotiated; 4) greater attention to informing and educating "the street" on both sides.

If these four policies are pursued, it is still not too late to reverse course and

salvage the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Each party has major and fundamental misperceptions of the other; the process described here would work to convince the many skeptics on both sides that their counterpart does deeply want a settlement. Indeed, the prospects of success are enhanced because both parties are so clearly interlocked that they have no viable alternatives. Without the peace process, the Palestinians will never reach independence or rid themselves of the Israeli military occupation. Without the process, the Israelis will be doomed to constant conflicts. They have other dangers looming: the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the region, the deterioration of several Arab societies with the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, and the constant danger of Arab terrorism. The best means to thwart all of these activities is to move on the peace process.

As the current crisis illustrates only too vividly, the vital interest of both sides is no guarantee of success but it is a guarantee that they will not be able to avoid negotiations indefinitely. The sooner the four principles indicated above are adopted, the sooner a successful peace process will resume. The parties will then be able together to seek to repair the damage caused by the al Aksa intifada.

Viewing the peace process as a continuing saga also has an important message for American Jews. Too often this community reacts to events and does so with emotion, even passion. That is typically American, and reflective of our media-driven society today. But a serious effort to secure Israel's security, peace, and vitality must mean that we are in this enterprise for the long haul -- years, perhaps decades. Instead, the majority of American Jews too often react to today's headlines, swinging wildly from a "peace is at hand" notion to one which postures that peace is impossible. Sadly, there are partisans of both views who are often not influenced by events no matter what happens. Instead, we need a sober, caring perspective which recognizes how difficult the task is, but nevertheless continues on in the faith that only through tireless and unending efforts will a peace process succeed.

To gain some perspective, a Rip Van Winkle awakening from a 25-year slumber would be astonished at Israel's peace with Egypt and Jordan (warts and all), its relations with other Arab states, and -- most of all -- its negotiations with Yasser Arafat. We don't need more Rip Van Winkles; we need more long-distance runners who can stay the course and will be will-

ing to support steps -- even very small steps -- on the road to creating a better Middle East and a viable and durable place for Israel in it. The American Jewish community should be organizing in the light of this perspective, recognizing that its efforts will have to take a very long time, celebrating the progress made rather than the bitter frustrations experienced, and committing itself to making sure that the United States continues to play the important role in this peace process which it has until now. This is a course which helps both the United States and Israel. It is an admirable path, and at this point of crisis in the region and change of leadership in Washington it is time for the American Jewish community to recognize the need for this long-term vision rather than to become mired in internal squabbling and loss of will. Only if the community moves in this wise and enlightened direction can it help turn a time of turmoil and trouble into a new era of progress and achievement toward the common objective of peace and security for Israel. ♦

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Towards an End to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By Naomi Chazan

I do not wish to take part in theoretical arguments about the life or death of the Oslo accords. Nor am I interested in engaging in the ongoing debates on who is to blame for the current crisis (on the assumption that no one is guiltless). The relevant and essential question is not what has gone awry and who is culpable, but rather how we can extract ourselves from this terrible situation and prevent further bloodshed by reaching a just and equitable solution acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians.

Neither proclaiming the death of Oslo nor adamantly heralding its virtuous life is useful. Israel stands today before two stark choices: continued war or a peace treaty with the Palestinians which will involve the creation of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders with adjustments based on an equal exchange of territories. The Oslo Accords, Yossi Beilin's excellent piece notwithstanding, failed to pinpoint this political outcome of the negotiation process.

Oslo's vision of a phased, interim set of agreements leading to an eventual permanent settlement has only resulted in delay, inaction, and misunderstanding. Yet while the Oslo process may be faulty, the principles that guided the Oslo Accords remain relevant. Two peoples inhabit this area, and must find a just, equitable means of sharing the land. It is therefore essential to continue and conclude final status talks that will allow for both Israelis and Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination on the land. Such an agreement must avoid the trap of Oslo by explicitly agreeing on the final status treaty from the outset, and then elaborating a schedule for implementation. No interim or partial arrangement is possible at this time.

Any solution, therefore, must approach the issues essential to a final status agreement and must recognize the self-determination rights of both Israelis and Palestinians. Such a solution should be based on the following principles, some of which correspond to those that Beilin suggested and some of which diverge from his proposals:

1. A Palestinian state will be established along the pre-1967 borders. If Israel seeks to annex major settlement clusters, it must agree to cede an equal amount of territory to the Palestinians.

2. Jerusalem will be a shared capital of Israel and Palestine. In order to find a solution that adequately addresses the complex issues surrounding the final status of Jerusalem, three parameters must be recognized. First, Jerusalem should not be physically divided. Second, both the Israeli and Palestinian national visions and desires for sovereignty must be respected. Third, whoever controls sections of Jerusalem must act as a guardian of its religious, cultural, and ethnic sites. The best solution will place Palestinian neighborhoods of the city under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli sections under Israeli sovereignty, and joint sovereignty will be established in the holy sites.

3. There must be a comprehensive solution to the issue of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. First, small and scattered settlement sites will have to be dismantled entirely (including all Jewish settlements in Gaza). Second, those Israelis residing in the occupied territories must be offered financial incentives to return to within the Green Line. Third, some settlements will remain in place by agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Such agreements may involve boundary adjustments and must be based on a full and equal exchange. Those settlers who remain within the boundaries of the Palestinian state will have to accept the jurisdiction of Palestinian authority.

4. Israel must take some responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem (including providing financial compensation and/or a program for family unification).

Although the Oslo Accords did not adequately address these issues, we cannot afford to abandon the pursuit of peace. The alternative is ongoing conflict and escalation of armed violence, which leads nowhere. There is no military solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In all probability, negotiations will commence while the fighting continues.

The understandings reached at Camp David should be the starting point for future dialogue aimed at concluding final status talks and designing a timetable for their implementation. The framework for negotiation may be

centered around a two-tier approach: a bilateral forum of Israelis and Palestinians for direct communication and negotiation, as well as an international oversight committee including U.S. and European Union supervision in order to guarantee the implementation of the accords.

In recent days, we have heard threats about unilateral action from both sides. Some Israelis have proposed that Israel unilaterally separate itself from the Palestinians, and the Palestinians threaten to unilaterally declare an independent state. Yet no unilateral actions can ultimately replace a cooperative, bilateral treaty, for only with such an agreement (which has been reached by a collaborative effort between both parties) can there be a long-lasting and mutually acceptable understanding.

Despite the political instability, leadership crisis, atmosphere of mistrust, and tremendous risks involved, now is the time to reach the most profound decision in Israel's history. A just peace with the Palestinians is in Israel's uppermost interest. Any other choice threatens not only Israel's economic, social, and international standing, but its actual survival. ♦

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The Spirit of Oslo

By Meron Benvenisti

Yossi Beilin's attempt to depict the Oslo Accords as the implementation of the 1978 Camp David Accords, signed by Begin and Sadat, with some additional points such as "making the PLO a partner to the talks," and transfer of territories in stages, is understandable, albeit farfetched. His intention is, apparently, to convince the Israeli political right that Oslo is a legitimate outcome of Begin's Autonomy Plan and therefore kosher. But in doing so, he intentionally obfuscates the revolutionary change that Oslo had ushered. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) and agreement on mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel -- and the symbolic handshake between Rabin and Arafat on September 13, 1993 -- have utterly transformed the Israeli - Palestinian feud from a primordial war into a rational, solvable conflict. The recognition of the legitimacy, autonomy and authority of the representatives of the other collective entity has not only created the precondition for a peace process but -- even more profoundly -- completely changed a basic tenet of Zionist ideology, namely, that there is only one legitimate collective entity in the Land of Israel and "the Arabs" are but a haphazard mass of humanity.

The first withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho -- and subsequent withdrawals -- created an irreversible step toward Palestinian self determination, for Israel's control over those areas was based on effective military control, and once relinquished, cannot be reimposed. Those who signed the DOP were aware of its meaning: even if an agreement on the final disposition of the territories is not achieved, the Palestinian Authority's (PA) territorial control would fulfill the basic condition for recognition as a sovereign state, under international law. This is precisely what in Camp David 1978 Menachem Begin wanted to avoid by calling the Palestinians "the Arabs of Eretz Israel" and designing the autonomy as a non-territorial entity. Those who declare the Oslo process "dead" do not wish to reconquer the PA controlled areas but to run away from the basic principles of the DOP. It is maybe politically expedient for Yossi Beilin to depict the "argument" over Oslo as "truly pathetic" but it really is a basic argument between those who believe in the inevitable partition of the Holy Land and the establishment of a viable Palestinian State, and those who would like to retain the majori-

ty of the Land of Israel, albeit with some Indian reservations. It is a typical Israeli internal argument which assumes that everything depends on how they define the parameters of the problem, and its solution, while the other side must accept the diktat or be defined as a "non partner."

The Palestinians would not let the Israelis unilaterally decide whether Oslo is dead or alive. For them, it is an international agreement that established their proto-state and therefore cannot be abrogated or terminated unilaterally, and as long as a substitute process is not established, it exists. Therefore Beilin's assertion that Oslo "outlived its usefulness" seem to Palestinians as an excuse not to fulfill Israel's obligations, mainly, further withdrawals.

It must be admitted that the Palestinian suspicions are justified for it is well known that Prime Minister Barak has never believed in the interim agreements of Oslo, which for him meant concessions which lead to further concessions without achieving a solution to the conflict. Barak has not accepted the gradual process that is at the very heart of the Oslo process and which entails an entire series of obtainable interim goals. The late, lamented, Yitzhak Rabin designed the process as a perpetual crisis management enterprise that needed the joint partnership of himself and Yassir Arafat. Yossi Beilin calls the belief in the spirit of Oslo "a romantic dream that would create such great affection between Israel and the Palestinians that there will be no problem in reaching a final agreement." Well, perhaps "no problem" is too strong, but the Oslo process certainly meant to create confidence and nurture hopes that conditions more conducive for a final agreement are feasible. That was its essence and its strength. Beilin's attempt to dismiss that aspect is probably caused by his present endorsement of Ehud Barak's approach to Oslo.

Barak, unlike Rabin, views Arafat as a nuisance and has refused to carry out commitments under signed agreements (withdrawals, safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza and release of prisoners). The prime minister's refusal to adopt gradualism had resulted in the strategy of demanding the "end of conflict" as a condition for any progress. When Yassir Arafat rejected Israel's generous, "for-a-limited-time-only" proposals at Camp David 2000, because he could not see them as sufficient to declare an "end of conflict," the Oslo process collapsed and the Israelis declared that "there is no partner for peace." They were disappointed that "end of con-

flict” cannot be obtained at a bargain price and were angry to discover that this kind of peace is perceived by the other side as merely perpetuating a gross injustice. Once hopes and illusions, so intrinsic to the Oslo process dissipated, violence erupted.

The difference between Israeli and Palestinian perceptions is caused by different conceptions of the nature of the conflict they are engaged in. For the Israelis, the starting point is the 1967 war and the issue is the disposition of the occupied territories (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) on which they seek a territorial compromise. For the Palestinians, the starting point is 1947-8 war and the outstanding issue of the refugees is at the heart of their national movement -- The Return. This national Palestinian objective is perceived by the Israelis as a call for the destruction of the Jewish state. Even those Palestinians who understood that actual return to their former homes is unfeasible and bowed their heads to the reality of defeat, have emphasized the fact that accepting a total withdrawal from the Occupied Territories constitutes a painful compromise, for it is an agreement to settle for less than a quarter of their homeland. But the Israelis refuse to open the old accounts, insist on retaining parts of the Territories and utterly repudiate the Right of Return in any form.

It is unlikely that such profound conflicting perceptions would allow the attainment of a final agreement, which both sides can view as “end of conflict.” It is even unwise to suggest it as a political objective because an “all or nothing” approach imposes a dichotomous situation -- peace or war -- on a condition which can be defined as a twilight zone between these extreme situations. Therefore an Oslo type process is bound to reemerge, but only after the lessons from the previous process will be learned. Yossi Beilin, the initiator of Oslo, should use his creative genius to devise the new process, instead of suggesting a “permanent agreement” similar to the one offered to the Palestinians in Camp David 2000, and rejected because it represents a solution that fits only the Israeli formulation of the problem.

Yassir Arafat is the leader of the Palestinian people and therefore is the only interlocutor. His commitment to peace is firm, although his perception of peace is not that of Israel. If one thinks that a partner can be chosen by the other side according to his willingness to accept diktats, one is looking for a puppet, or a quisling. Arafat is neither.

This is a typical expression of Jewish paranoia. Every time Israel is faced with a violent reaction against its legitimate or arbitrary actions and policies, a “war of survival” is declared. Thus a few thousand Israelis armed with assault rifles have led a strong nation, with a nuclear option and a powerful army, to adopt the fiction that it is engaged in a struggle for its very existence, and the world Jewish community is mobilized to save it. Assuming for a moment that the Palestinians, indeed, desire to destroy Israel; can they? What is the alternative to seeking peace? Perpetual war?

I think that Grossman's suggestion is right, theoretically, but it is practically unfeasible because no serious Israeli political group supports it under the present circumstances. Therefore it is an ideological debating point, not a concrete political choice.

Unilateral separation is a euphemism for collective punishment and a substitute for military pressure. It can be implemented by using the vastly superior power of the Israelis against the weak and totally dependent Palestinians. Its costs are born by the Palestinians only. Nobody should understand “separate and equal” other than in the American context of race relations. Desirable? I leave it to you.

American Jewry should not base their activity to conform to the heroic posters of Israel hung on the walls of community centers, and to the one dimensional, proud and always right image of Israel. Life and political choices in Israel are more complex than it seems from afar. ♦

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A Negotiated Agreement: The Logical Approach

By Joseph Alpher

Yossi Beilin's "defense" of the Oslo process is soundly reasoned and persuasive. Similarly, his outline for a final status agreement points to the only logical approach to peace. Roughly speaking, it comprises the principles that Ehud Barak offered Yasir Arafat at Camp David last July. But precisely because Arafat has chosen to reject that offer and opt for violent confrontation, we must inquire a bit deeper as to what went wrong with Oslo to bring about the current serious state of affairs.

Oslo succeeded, and continues to succeed, in generating the "vocabulary" of the peace process. Particularly with regard to final status (where Beilin correctly notes that Oslo is no more than a "preparatory stage"), Oslo sets the agenda by spelling out the specific issues -- settlements, borders, refugees, Jerusalem, etc. -- that must be resolved. It is hard to imagine a renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace process that does not deal with all or most of the Oslo-prescribed final status issues. But Oslo failed from the very beginning to generate trust and confidence between the two sides. This was precisely one of the objectives of an interim process. Instead, the slow, phase-by-phase execution of Oslo has rendered it vulnerable to extremists from both sides, and has produced areas of glaring non-compliance with interim confidence-building measures.

The worst of these violations in many ways constitute the framework for the current violence. Palestinians have acquired weapons at a scope far beyond the restrictions agreed under Oslo. Unbridled incitement of Palestinian youth has produced the shock troops of the Intifada. Israel has continued to build settlements, and failed to turn over territory, in a manner that has persuaded many Palestinians that the Israeli government has no intention of creating a territorially viable Palestinian state.

Short of a return to negotiations in a peaceful atmosphere, the options available at present are limited. Unilateral "separation" measures cannot solve the problem of the "heartland" and Gaza Strip settlements, or of Jerusalem; by the same token, the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state would change nothing on the ground for Palestinians, unless for the worse. Nor is the unilateral dismantling of the most problematic Israeli settlements, increasingly advocated by

some on the Left, anything but a measure of last resort: carried out under fire, it sends a message of weakness that is not conducive to sound future relations or even to productive negotiations. In this sense, the current Intifada is at least in part a consequence of the failed deterrence that was inadvertently projected by Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon last May.

When final status talks are renewed, Israel will have to insist on alterations to its Camp David proposals -- mainly in security arrangements -- based on the lessons of this Intifada. It will also have to take care to continue to project a strong deterrent image. This reflects an ongoing sense, reinforced by the Intifada and by Arab and Islamic reaction, that it will take time, perhaps generations, before many of Israel's Arab neighbors actually legitimize the sovereign existence of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East.

But if this is the case then why, some will ask, should Israel bother to make peace? The answer lies in Beilin's challenge to doubters and opponents of the peace track to offer better alternatives. In particular, those on the Right who say "we told you so" regarding Arafat's lack of credibility and the Palestinians' abortive pledge to avoid violence must address the consequences of their own ongoing opposition to territorial compromise and support for the settler movement. Ostensibly with the best of Zionist and Jewish motives, the settlers have put Israel on a track that must inevitably place the five million Jews and four million Arabs who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, in either an apartheid Israel or a binational Arab-Jewish state. Both these options bespeak endless conflict and suffering. Neither in any way approximates the Zionist homeland that we all seek. Peace, however cold and problematic, is a far better alternative, and is the only logical building block for better relations in future.

Because these issues will ultimately affect the well being -- indeed the nature of Jewish life -- of the Diaspora as well as of Israelis, North American Jewry has a right and an obligation to speak out. Moreover, what Jews in America say and do about the Arab-Israeli peace process in coming months could substantively affect the next U.S. administration's attitude and readiness to assist in peacemaking. ♦

Joseph Alpher is an independent writer and consultant. He is former Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and former Director of the American Jewish Committee's Israel/Middle East Office in Jerusalem.

An American Jewish Perspective

By Theodore R. Mann

Yossi Beilin's analysis in his "Moving Forward After Oslo" essay is right on the mark. I agree with his appraisal of Oslo's historic role and of its present status. As for his outline of five principles on which a permanent agreement should be based, I will only say that they certainly seem equitable and just to me as a deeply interested observer, but beyond that it would be inappropriate for me to comment. Americans generally and American Jews in particular believe that Israel and the Palestinians must find a way of coexisting peacefully for the sake of all concerned, including the United States, but the details of a peace agreement acceptable to Israel is not for American Jews to decide or, in my judgement, even to suggest.

There is something stunningly bizarre about the claim that recent events show that Arafat cannot be trusted as a partner for peace. That claim is based on an assumption that agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority were in the past and must be in the future based on something called "trust". That was never so. Peace agreements between warring parties are never based on trust. The 1973-74 cease fire agreements with Syria were not based on trust. Oslo was not based on trust. Rabin's decision to shake Arafat's hand in September 1993 was not based on trust.

The very first of Beilin's five principles addresses the most important aspect of the "trust" issue. It restates what has always been Israel's most fundamental and unchangeable demand, viz., that the territories from which it withdraws must be demilitarized except for a police force. Absent such a commitment, Israel would have to continue to control the territories forever, because otherwise Israel's security and its ability to protect its citizens from terrorism would be dangerously compromised. And Israel's ability to make certain that such a commitment in a peace agreement is kept must be based on Israel's strength, not in its trust of Arafat or the Palestinian Authority. So it has always been and so it will always be.

Much the same must be said about the question of whether the Palestinian people still desire Israel's destruction and if so, whether a peace agreement would be a delusion. An enforceable peace agreement with a demilitarized

Palestinian state will not be a delusion, regardless of whether or not the Palestinians desire Israel's destruction. We have always known that the Palestinians would much prefer that there be no Israel, and that given half a chance they might try to bring that about. It is up to Israel to make sure they never get half a chance. No doubt most Israelis too would prefer that Palestinians lived elsewhere. Perhaps with the passage of years and a great improvement in the Palestinian economy there will be a change in the attitudes of both peoples toward each other. That is the hope. But clearly Israel and the new Palestinian state will never even in the very distant future have the kind of relationship that characterizes the relations between say, America and Canada.

The question of what Israel can do now to advance the cause of peace is the hardest question of all. The Palestinian preference that there be no Israel is precisely the reason why Israel must respond very strongly to the current Intifada and the acts of terror. A non-response or a very weak response will encourage the belief, fantasy though it may be, that Israel can be defeated. We saw the Palestinian streets' reaction to the IDF withdrawal from the area of Joseph's tomb in Nablus. It was seen as an Israeli defeat and encouraged more rage and frenzy. The current tragedy is that a weak response risks Israel's security by encouraging Palestinians to believe they can prevail, while a strong response does not give Arafat a way to call upon the Palestinians to end the confrontation and to do so in a way that does not denigrate his stature in the eyes of his public. The current tragedy is that no one has been able to find a path between these two reactions to Palestinian violence. I regret to have to say it, but perhaps at this time there is none.

It is for that reason that at this time I disagree with David Grossman's suggestion that Israel should close most of the West Bank and Gaza settlements, thereby unilaterally bringing about the second of Beilin's five principles. Most of the settlements should have been closed a very long time ago. Indeed, to those with foresight, it was clear at the outset more than two decades ago that the construction of settlements by religious settlers basing their claim to Palestinian land on the Bible was an invitation to religious war and could only end in tragedy. But while the current violence continues, such a unilateral closure would be seen a great victory and would almost certainly bring about a great increase in Palestinian violence. I hope there is or will someday be a leader in Israel who, in a period of calm, will have the political courage to do so. So far there has not been. Even Yitzhak Rabin, in

the wake of the Baruch Goldstein massacre, when a closure of the Hebron settlement might have been justifiable to most Israelis, did not do so.

The most constructive role for American Jewish leadership today is 1) to come to understand, and to teach American Jews generally to understand, that the killing and terrorism we are seeing now every day is the only alternative there is to a peace process, 2) to support Israel in its times of trouble in every way possible, including traveling there, especially now, and 3) to urge our government and President Bush, to continue to be as supportive of Israel now as President Clinton and the Congress have been.

When there comes a time that the parties to the conflict once again (weeks from now? years from now?) seek a peaceful resolution, those in the Jewish community who like what is happening now will try to prevent it. My judgement is that they will be fewer in number than heretofore. All the rest of us, and this time I hope it will be a totally unified Jewish community, will stand behind the peace process as never before. ♦

Theodore R. Mann is currently Chair of Israel Policy Forum's Executive Committee. He is also past chair of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as well as of the Jewish Council of Public Affairs. Mr. Mann lives in Philadelphia, PA.

Oslo and the Settlements: A Collision Course

By Janet Aviad

I indeed share Beilin's appraisal of the role of the Oslo agreement. First, Oslo was a breakthrough because it was based upon mutual recognition of the other's existence as a people and a partner for peace. Second, Oslo freed Israel of the occupation of the main cities in the West Bank and Gaza and allowed for the creation of a Palestinian Authority with sovereignty over these cities (Area A). It also set out a time table for future stages which should have culminated in a final status agreement five years ago from the signing of the original agreement.

At the same time that one credits Oslo with a major breakthrough, it is important to note one of the serious weaknesses in the Oslo agreements: the deliberate avoidance of the settlement issue. Thus, it would have been extremely appropriate and enormously significant to have removed the settlements of the Gaza Strip, for instance, at the time that Gaza was handed over to the Palestinian Authority as Area A. It would also have been more significant to state that settlement expansion be frozen. Since 1993, when the Oslo agreements were signed, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza has doubled. The settlements constitute the main obstacle to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity between its northern, central, and southern parts.

Although I am critical of aspects of Oslo, I defend the agreement for what it did do: mutual recognition; beginning of the end of the occupation. It is in light of these advances that the attack upon Oslo is taking place today in Israel.

The motive underlying the attack upon the historic role of the Oslo agreements is certainly not academic or reflective. Rather, the question is raised by opponents of peace in order to discredit the only agreement which Israel has made with the Palestinians. The current debate was launched in order to discredit the agreement and de-legitimate those who supported it. In fact, some of the anti-Oslo materials which have appeared in demonstrations of the settlers incite against the Peace Camp in ways which remind us of the poisonous atmosphere of pre-assassination Israel.

I agree with most of the points in Beilin's final status agreement, and have serious questions about two. A Palestinian state will be founded in the West Bank and Gaza along the 1967 borders. The big question is the future of the settlements. I do no

think that it is possible to encompass large blocs, which would include 80% of the settlers, annex them, and exchange land on the basis of equality for the annexed areas. The principle of a land swap is indeed the only way to permit any settlement annexation. However, the number of Palestinians who would be annexed along with the settlers makes a large bloc process nigh impossible. Therefore, many more settlements will be dismantled than any Israeli politician has dared to admit if the occupation is to end in a real peace with the Palestinians.

Second, regarding Jerusalem, I assume that Yossi Beilin refers to all the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, both those within the walls and those in the inner city, when he states that these will be recognized as al Quds and part of the Palestinian sovereign Palestinian state. Whether the Palestinians establish the capital of their state in Abu Dis, or in another external neighborhood is their business and not ours to dictate.

Third, when Yossi Beilin states that an unarmed Palestinian state will be created, I assume he means that heavy arms will not be permitted. The Palestinian police is armed and will remain armed in the near future.

No Palestinian leader has spoken against the recognition of Israel's existence which was the basis of the Oslo agreement. The demand has been for the end of the occupation, 1967 borders, and nothing beyond. In fact, the real demand has been for the fulfillment of Oslo. A peace agreement is not only not a delusion but is the single exit from the more than 100-year cycle of violence.

We in Peace Now have fought against settlement construction for more than 20 years, and have argued, often as voices in the wilderness, that settlements constitute a major political obstacle to peace, a security burden, a moral stain, and an economic waste. All these claims have been demonstrated as correct once again in recent months -- in peace making efforts and in conflict.

We have demanded from one prime minister after another that all settlement construction be frozen. We have issued report after report indicating the true facts about settlement building and settler behavior. We have called for the dismantling of particularly problematic places such as Hebron and all the Gaza settlements.

Therefore, I sympathize with David Grossman's suggestion, but believe that it is a political impossibility. The only realistic way to reach the national agree-

ment necessary to support the government in settlement dismantling is within the context of a peace agreement. A negotiated deal which guarantees security in exchange for land will be supported, even when the price is evacuation of Israeli settlements. This is what happened in the agreement with Egypt, and must be repeated with the Palestinians. Even then, the actual process of settler's returning to Israel will be painful, difficult, and expensive but inevitable.

Unilateral separation is not possible without removing all the settlements and dividing Jerusalem in half. Palestine is not Lebanon and the unilateral withdrawal seems to me to be a flight from reality.

In order to advance peace in the immediate future, Israel could announce its willingness to end the closure and other punitive measures in exchange for a cessation of violence. Further, Israel could announce its willingness to end all one-sided acts such as settlement building, again as part of the deal for a cease fire when negotiations would be re-launched.

North American Jewry should express solidarity with the peace initiatives of Israel and should support organizations and individuals who advance this cause. Second, North American Jews can and must urge the new American President and Congress to maintain American involvement in the Middle East peace making process.

Ehud Barak erred when he declared that Arafat is not a partner, as do all others who echo his phrase. As we argued before Oslo, and so after, he is the recognized leader, even elected, of the Palestinian people and therefore, he is our partner. There is no doubt that Israelis trust the partner less today than before the current uprising, but that will not stop anyone from negotiating with Arafat.

Neither side has fulfilled the conditions of Oslo. Hence, neither trusts the other. But that is not the issue. There is no choice but for the same partners to return to the negotiating table, and attempt to work out a final or partial agreement. Each will be cautious and demand staged monitored implementation of whichever agreement is signed, in order to overcome basic distrust. And this is quite understandable and acceptable. ♦

Janet Aviad is a former professor at the Hebrew University and a veteran activist with the Israeli peace movement Shalom Achshav (Peace Now). She has been a primary organizer of the creative and effective peace initiatives undertaken by Shalom Achshav including the "Hands Around Jerusalem" rally in 1990.

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As this goes to print, the Israeli people are heading into elections to vote for the next prime minister of Israel. By the time you receive this in your mailbox, we will know whether Sharon or Barak has won. In our opinion, regardless of who the next prime minister of Israel is, the arguments and issues raised in these essays are key to understanding the future prospects for peace in Israel. The viewpoints of these writers still bear our full attention. We hope you find it an informative and educational read.

Seeking Peace, Pursuing Justice